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distribution: The UK growth 




Theories of ‘growth models’ explain capitalist diversity by reference to shifting drivers of aggregate 
demand in different national economies. This article expands the growth models framework 
beyond its conventional focus on debt-driven and export-driven demand, through an ideational 
analysis of Thatcher’s vision of a property-owning democracy, and Blair’s knowledge-driven 
growth agenda. Drawing on policymakers’ statements, it shows how these hypothetical growth 
models differed from the debt-driven growth model that ultimately prevailed. Using data on the 
distribution of wealth and wages, it highlights how both approaches failed to generate sustainable 
demand; in Thatcher’s case, because of an insufficiently broad distribution of capital ownership, 
in Blair’s case, because of an insufficiently broad distribution of lucrative knowledge work. This 
indicates that explanations of dysfunctional growth models need to consider not just the split of 
national income between labour and capital, but also the distribution of both labour income and 
capital income between households.
Keywords
demand, growth models, ideational political economy, knowledge economy, neoliberalism, 
property-owning democracy
Introduction
Theories of ‘growth models’, as with many analyses in the field of political economy, 
focus upon the social, institutional, political and economic structures that underpin devel-
opments in politics and the economy. In contrast to theories of capitalist diversity that 
highlight supply-side differences in the institutional configuration of production – the 
relationships (or lack thereof) between government, organised labour, the educational 
system and private firms (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001) – the growth models approach 
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emphasises the significance of demand, drawing attention to the different ways in which 
developed democracies have sought to substitute for broad-based wage-led increases in 
aggregate demand since the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s.1 The extent to which post-
Fordist demand is driven by business investment, government spending, exports and/or 
private consumption (which itself might reflect either or both of wage growth and expand-
ing household debt) has implications for the political and economic configuration of 
countries. It influences the composition of their economies (their relative reliance upon 
finance, manufacturing, in-person services and so forth, both for productivity growth and 
for employment), as well as their policy options (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016). Growth 
models also have implications for the relationship between countries: with countries that 
relied on credit-fuelled household consumption to drive demand often acting as export 
markets for countries that maintain demand by running a persistent current-account sur-
plus (Johnston and Regan, 2018).
Interestingly, these analyses suggest that many of these post-Fordist growth models 
are (more or less) dysfunctional – that is to say, incapable of producing stable growth over 
the longer term. In place of rising demand predicated upon broad-based wage growth, 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States have instead depended on 
debt-fuelled household consumption as a source of demand, a form of ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’ reliant upon the ongoing availability of cheap credit, often secured against 
booming house prices (Crouch, 2009; Hay, 2013; Jessop, 2015). But countries that rely 
upon export-led growth (such as Germany) might find themselves in a similarly unsus-
tainable position, if demand in the markets that they are exporting to is also reliant upon 
debt-fuelled household consumption.
This raises an important question: how do countries come to adopt dysfunctional 
growth models? The goal of this article is to show the centrality of ideas to this process. 
Building on Lavoie and Stockhammer’s (2013) insightful typology of growth models, it 
argues that studying the way in which growth models were explained and justified by key 
political actors provides insight into how popular support for dysfunctional growth mod-
els has been mobilised and sustained. Moreover, to the extent that we can interpret these 
‘hypothetical growth models’ not just as propaganda or ‘statecraft’, but as a reflection of 
the cognitive beliefs of policy elites, these ideas (and their shortcomings) may have 
played a causal role in the (unwitting) adoption of dysfunctional growth models.
Specifically, this article reconstructs the growth models implicit in the property-own-
ing democracy discourse of the Thatcher era, and the knowledge-driven growth discourse 
championed by Tony Blair. It shows how these hypothetical growth models differed, not 
just from the dysfunctional debt-driven reality of the British growth model, but also from 
the hypothetical growth model that Lavoie and Stockhammer describe as ‘neoliberalism 
in theory’. This analysis helps to explain both the appeal and the limitations of these 
growth models, and how they related to the realities of UK economic policymaking in 
recent decades.
Clearly, analyses of the economic policies and ideologies of Thatcher and Blair are 
legion; any article-length treatment of this subject can only present a highly reductionist 
account of the pluralism of British political debate and policymaking under the two long-
est-serving Prime Ministers of modern times. Moreover, neither Thatcherism nor Blairism 
was particularly concerned about the demand-side of the economy. In keeping with the 
dominant economic orthodoxies of their times, their respective agendas focused on sup-
ply-side reforms to increase productive capacity, assuming that demand would follow. 
Nevertheless, by focusing on the demand implications of these economic policy 
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programmes, we gain valuable insight into the evolution of the UK growth model in par-
ticular, and the origins of dysfunctional growth models more broadly.
To this end, the article begins by outlining Lavoie and Stockhammer’s (2013) classifi-
cation of countries depending on their comparative reliance upon profit-led or wage-led 
demand, and whether their distributional policies favour capital or labour. Only where 
demand and distribution are aligned would we expect to see a stable growth process. The 
following section explores how Thatcher’s imagined ideal of a ‘property-owning democ-
racy’ satisfied this criterion, implying a profit-led demand model under pro-capital distri-
butional conditions. However, it also highlights how this model required capital to be 
widely distributed within society. While the fire-sale of state assets gestured in this direc-
tion, Thatcher ultimately presided over a concentration of productive capital in the hands 
of a wealthy few. The penultimate section examines how the concept of knowledge-
driven growth, championed by Blair, implied a shift in bargaining power from capital to 
labour, and thus a stable wage-led growth process – despite only minor changes in eco-
nomic policy direction. Interestingly, the New Labour government did coincide with a 
shift in the distribution of national output in favour of wage earners. However, the fact 
that this shift also coincided with increased income inequality meant that the proceeds of 
growth once more accrued to individuals with a lower marginal propensity to consume, 
undermining wage-led growth. Both cases highlight the importance not just of the distri-
bution of national income between capital and labour, but also the distribution of national 
income within capital and labour shares (Behringer and van Treeck, 2019; Clift and 
McDaniel, 2021). The article concludes by highlighting some of the broader implications 
of this analysis, both for academic political economy, and for the practice of economic 
policy in developed democracies today.
Growth models
How do countries come to adopt dysfunctional growth models? A schematic answer to 
this question can be found in one of the key contributions to the growth models literature: 
Lavoie and Stockhammer’s (2013) account of wage-led growth. The authors identify a 
typology of growth models, differentiated along two dimensions (see Table 1). On this 
account, the ‘distributional policies’ of a particular country can be configured so as to 
distribute overall output (to a greater or lesser degree) towards capital or towards labour. 
Demand can depend (to a greater or lesser degree) upon the spending of profit-earners, in 
Table 1. Typology of growth models.
Distributional policies
 Pro-capital Pro-labour
Demand regime Profit-led (a) Trickle-down capitalism; 
‘neoliberalism in theory’
(b) Doomed social 
reforms; stagflation
Wage-led (c) Stagnation or external demand 
stimulation (in the form of debt-
driven or export-driven growth); 
‘actually existing neoliberalism’
(d) Postwar golden age; 
wage-led growth process
Source: Adapted from Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013).
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the form of business investment and/or spending by households that receive income from 
capital, or the spending of wage earners (a country’s ‘demand regime’).
Dysfunction arises when growth is wage-led but distributional policies funnel national 
income towards capital, or when growth is profit-led but distributional policies funnel 
national income towards labour. In both of these cases, there is insufficient demand to 
sustain economic growth, leading either to stagnation, or to the adoption of unsustainable 
substitutes, such as debt-driven consumption, or net exports to economies engaging in 
debt-driven consumption. This analysis draws heavily on neo-Kaleckian macroeconom-
ics. Kalecki (1944) argued that redistribution of income from rich capitalists to poor 
labourers offered the best way of generating the aggregate demand necessary to driving 
full employment (stimulating consumption, thereby stimulating capital investment and 
thus job creation). More recently, scholars have noted that the demand implications of 
shifting the distribution of national output from capital to labour in this way are ambigu-
ous: Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) note that increased profits can stimulate higher levels of 
capital investment and thus employment, consumption and growth. If the former dynamic 
dominates, growth is ‘wage-led’; if the latter holds true, growth is ‘profit-led’ (see also 
Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016).
On Lavoie and Stockhammer’s account, dysfunctional growth regimes have arisen 
from an anti-clockwise journey around Table 1, beginning in the bottom-right quadrant 
(d), representing the Fordist compromise of the postwar era. This period was character-
ised by pro-labour distributional policies, such as strong trade unions, comprehensive 
employment rights and collective wage-bargaining arrangements. When growth is ‘wage-
led’, such policies imply a virtuous circle of mass consumption incentivising greater busi-
ness investment, enhancing productivity to drive up wages and profits alike, ensuring 
consumption continues to grow.
Arguably, however, this outcome depends upon the managed international capital 
flows of the Bretton Woods era, and is incompatible with the globalisation of trade and 
finance. As the postwar economic order unravelled over the course of the 1970s, attempts 
to skew national income towards labour (or even maintain the existing distribution) did 
not produce domestic investment but rather import-driven consumption, currency devalu-
ation, inflation and unemployment: the doomed social reforms attempted by the likes of 
Mitterrand in the early 1980s (Hall, 1986). In an era of globalisation, growth is necessar-
ily profit-led, and pro-labour distributional policies would thus stymie growth, as per cell 
(b) of Table 1. (The extent to which this diagnosis of globalisation is empirically accurate 
is of course contestable – for a useful summary of the often-weak evidence, see Hay and 
Wincott, 2012, especially Chapter 3.)
If this analysis is correct, and growth is profit-led – namely, if higher profitability 
encourages greater investment, job creation and consumption – then pro-capital distribu-
tional policies should drive up growth, as spending by businesses and owners of capital 
supports aggregate demand. Pro-capital distributional policies include many of the eco-
nomic reforms familiar from the last 40 years of neoliberal economics: labour market 
flexibility, reductions in trade union powers, lower minimum wages and decreased wel-
fare spending. Lavoie and Stockhammer identify this growth model with the theory of 
trickle-down economics commonly associated with neoliberalism, corresponding to cell 
(a) of Table 1.
There is a paradox here however: why should businesses reinvest their profits, on the 
trickle-down account? Where is the demand to inspire that business investment coming 
from? If the distribution of national output is skewed in favour of capital, then one 
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possibility is that this demand will come from recipients of capital income. This form of 
sustainable capital-led growth assumes either (1) that there are only small differentials 
between capital and labour income, in terms of their recipients’ propensity to consume 
(Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016; Lavoie and Stockhammer, 2013) or (2) that capital antici-
pates demand from future wage earners, who see a substantial productivity-driven expan-
sion in their wages, even after adjusting for an enlarged capital share of national income. 
If these assumptions do not hold, then demand under pro-capital distributional policies 
must either fall short (leading to unused capacity and unemployment), or come from an 
alternative source, such as debt-driven household consumption or net exports.
Debt-driven household consumption cannot be sustained indefinitely; at some point, 
unavailability of credit will lead to a shortfall in demand, and thus damage growth. 
Strikingly, Lavoie and Stockhammer argue that the same is generally true for net exports 
too. This needs further explanation: might export-led growth not be a viable strategy for 
countries in a neoliberal era, with the wage demands of disciplined labour lowered in 
order to maintain international competitiveness, and businesses investing in future pro-
ductive capacity in return (a pattern commonly associated with the coordinated market 
economies of northern Europe, as per Hall and Soskice, 2001)? Lavoie and Stockhammer 
point out that such a dynamic can only apply in a limited number of countries at any given 
time. Because the world as a whole is a closed economy, demand for these exports in the 
net-importer countries must come from (1) higher debt levels, (2) a higher propensity to 
consume among recipients of capital income and/or (3) productivity-fuelled wage growth. 
To the extent that (1) predominates, net exports are as unsustainable a source of demand 
as debt-driven consumption – leading Lavoie and Stockhammer to characterise both these 
possibilities as examples of pro-capital distributional policies in the context of a wage-led 
growth regime, corresponding to cell (c) of Table 1.
Why, then, do governments adopt (and persist with) dysfunctional growth models? 
Interestingly, the mismatch Lavoie and Stockhammer posit between ‘neoliberalism in 
theory’ and ‘neoliberalism in practice’ suggests that ideas may play an important role in 
explaining growth model dysfunction. One possibility is that political actors may have 
intended to bring about the stable growth model of ‘neoliberalism in theory’, but due to 
mistaken beliefs about the prevailing demand regime, instead made decisions that resulted 
in dysfunctional ‘neoliberalism in practice’. On this account, choice of growth model can 
be explained (at least in part) by policymakers’ ‘instrumental’, ‘epistemic’, ‘causal’ or 
‘cognitive’ beliefs about the economy, neatly described by Vivien Schmidt as ideas about 
‘what is, and what to do’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306; see also Béland and Cox, 2010; Campbell, 
1998; Hall, 1993).2 Alternatively (and potentially also additionally), the idea of ‘neoliber-
alism in theory’ may have helped to secure popular support for ‘neoliberalism in prac-
tice’, by promising that pro-capital distributional policies would result in broad-based 
economic growth (a critique of trickle-down economics as propaganda often levelled by 
Marxist scholars – see, for example, Harvey, 2005). In this instance, policymakers need 
not have believed the case for ‘neoliberalism in theory’ for themselves. They might have 
self-consciously acted in the capitalist interest, promoting pro-capital distributional poli-
cies as an end in themselves, as on the Marxist account; or they might have been indiffer-
ent as to the outcomes of this economic policy agenda, choosing it primarily for its 
strategic merits in terms of partisan politics, as scholars of ‘statecraft’ have sought to 
argue with reference to both Thatcher and Blair (Bulpitt, 1986; Burnham, 2001).
Irrespective of whether ‘neoliberalism in theory’ reflects mistaken cognitive beliefs on 
the part of policymakers, or a more-or-less disingenuous way of securing popular support, 
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Lavoie and Stockhammer’s account suggests that understanding policy elites’ ideas will 
help to explain the adoption and persistence of dysfunctional growth models. The remain-
der of this article will evaluate this ideational explanation of growth model dysfunction 
by reference to two examples from recent UK political history: Thatcher’s property-own-
ing democracy and Blair’s knowledge-driven growth.
Thatcher and property-owning democracy
That Thatcher saw the British economy as entering an era of profit-led demand was evi-
dent from her first speech as Conservative leader:
the way to recovery is through profits, good profits today leading to high investment, leading to 
well paid jobs, leading to a better standard of living tomorrow. No profits mean no investment 
and that means a dying industry geared to yesterday’s world, and that means fewer jobs 
tomorrow. (Thatcher, 1975)
Consistent with this outlook, Thatcher embarked upon a series of supply-side reforms 
that sought to improve profitability, at the expense of labour’s share of national income. 
These pro-capital distributional policies included wide-ranging tax cuts for businesses 
and higher earners; changes to the scope and generosity of the welfare state, reducing 
support for lower income households; and labour market reforms designed to disem-
power trade unions and diminish employee rights. To the extent that demand entered into 
the equation at all, the assumption appears to have been that businesses would invest and 
recipients of enhanced profits would consume, thereby sustaining demand through a 
trickle-down effect.
Yet, this interpretation of the Thatcherite growth model omits an important part of her 
policy agenda, one that was also foreshadowed in her 1975 conference speech. In her 
opening oration, Thatcher (1975) depicted herself as ‘following in the footsteps . . . of 
Anthony Eden, who set us the goal of a property-owning democracy – a goal we still 
pursue today’. Thatcher would return to the idea of property-owning democracy repeat-
edly throughout her premiership, intertwining it with the theme of popular capitalism:
We Conservatives believe in popular capitalism – believe in a property-owning democracy . . . 
The great political reform of the last century was to enable more and more people to have a vote. 
Now the great Tory reform of this century is to enable more and more people to own property. 
Popular capitalism is nothing less than a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of 
the nation. (Thatcher, 1986)
The concept of a property-owning democracy had a long history in Conservative Party 
intellectual circles, as an alternative to socialist nationalisation and state provision 
(Francis, 2012; Howell, 1984). Under Thatcher, the idea would become closely associ-
ated with two initiatives in particular: the sale of publicly owned housing stock, under the 
auspices of the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme, and the privatisation of state-run enterprises 
(Béland, 2007; Edwards, 2017).
The ‘Right to Buy’ legislation allowed tenants of state-owned council housing to pur-
chase their homes at heavily discounted prices, transferring a substantial quantity of 
assets from the public sector to private individuals. As one of the architects of the 1980 
Housing Act noted, accurately, ‘no single piece of legislation has enabled the transfer of 
so much capital wealth from the state to the people’ (Heseltine, 1980). The new law 
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allowed tenants of council housing of at least 3 years’ standing to purchase their homes at 
a hefty discount (from a 33% reduction on market price up to 50%, for residents with a 
tenancy of 20 years or longer). Local authorities were obliged to offer mortgages to pur-
chasers (Wilson, 1999).
The Thatcher government’s privatisation plans resulted in a further transfer of wealth 
from the public sector to the private sector. Notably, privatised industries were not simply 
auctioned-off to the highest bidder. Employees and members of the general public were 
generally given the opportunity to purchase shares too, and were often prioritised ahead 
of larger investors when share offerings proved oversubscribed (Parker, 2009, 2013); 
Oversubscriptions were themselves hardly surprising given the generous discounts on 
offer. The privatisations of British Telecom in 1984 and British Gas in 1986 were accom-
panied by broad-based marketing campaigns, intended to raise public awareness of the 
sell-offs and encourage average households to invest in equities for the first time. Indeed, 
the privileging of small investors caused consternation in some Conservative circles, 
where the trade-off between pursuing a property-owning democracy, generating a fiscal 
surplus for the Treasury, and pleasing ‘big City investors’ was explicitly acknowledged 
(Francis, 2012: 293). These tensions highlight how broadening asset ownership did not 
always sit comfortably alongside more conventional pro-capital distributional policies.
Significantly, ‘property-owning democracy’ appears to offer an alternative to trickle-
down economics as a means of resolving the problem of demand under a pro-capital 
distributional regime – at least, in theory. Recall that the key puzzle of a profit-led demand 
regime is what incentivises businesses to invest. Trickle-down economics requires con-
sumption demand from capital owners, implying labour and capital have broadly compa-
rable marginal propensities to consume, a conjecture that finds limited empirical support 
in modern capitalist societies (Stockhammer, 2015). By contrast, property-owning 
democracy posits a wider distribution of capital, and thus a wider distribution of capital 
income – aligning the tendency to consume capital income more closely with the average 
household’s marginal propensity to consume.
Such a growth model would however require a far-reaching redistribution of the total 
capital stock. The Thatcher government’s redistributive efforts focused only on govern-
ment-owned assets, and even then only a fraction of these were redistributed to poorer 
households with a higher marginal propensity to consume. Although between 1979 and 
1988, the percentage of the population who owned shares increased almost threefold, this 
still represented only around one in five people (Marsh, 1991: 474). Between 1979 and 
1997, the proceeds of privatisation averaged a mere 0.7% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per year (Coutts and Gudgin, 2015: 35): even accounting for the fact that hefty 
discounts ensured that the value of the capital purchased exceeded the price paid, the 
volume of productive assets redistributed was clearly modest. Indeed, strictly speaking, 
only the discounted portion of these assets was redistributed rather than merely exchanged, 
as these assets were sold at an undervalue rather than given away for free (aside from 
modest allocations of share capital to existing employees – see Parker, 2009, 2013). And, 
although there is minimal data available regarding the characteristics of the households 
that participated in these share sales, it seems probable that the primary beneficiaries were 
more affluent households with a lower marginal propensity to consume. Certainly, the 
majority of shares were sold to financial institutions, to the benefit of them and their cus-
tomers (Parker, 2013: 520–521).
By comparison, the Right to Buy scheme involved a greater volume of assets, sold at 
larger discounts, to a broader cross-section of society. Between 1980 and 1996, local 
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councils, housing associations and new town corporations sold almost 1.8 million dwell-
ings under the scheme, the bulk of them in the period 1981–1990 (Wilson, 1999). The 
proportion of owner-occupied housing stock increased from 52% in 1971 to 58.6% in 
1981 and 68% in 1991 (Backhouse, 2002). However, for owner-occupiers, appreciation 
in the value of housing stock did not amount to a new income stream that could be used 
to supplement consumption spending. To realise these gains required either selling the 
asset (therefore relinquishing future capital appreciation), or else borrowing against it. In 
theory, it might be argued that such borrowing-for-consumption is not necessarily an 
example of debt-led demand: net household debt might be stable, if households only bor-
row against long-run trends in asset appreciation and capital accumulation. Nevertheless, 
there is a clear affinity between this hypothetical growth model and its debt-driven coun-
terpart, as both presuppose the growth of the financial system and the expansion of con-
sumer credit, leveraging up households such that they become more vulnerable to market 
shocks; the difference is that the hypothetical growth model also assumes that households 
and lenders have the foresight to navigate this, smoothing demand across the asset-price 
cycle.
A further problem with property-owning democracy as a growth model relates to 
changes in patterns of ownership. Over time, the distribution of capital (and capital 
income) will be reshaped through the market choices of private actors. The fact that 
returns on capital are brought within reach of poorer households with a higher marginal 
propensity to consume means that, over time, their share of wealth will decline relative to 
that of more affluent households that save and reinvest a higher proportion of those 
returns. Even in a property-owning democracy, pro-capital distributional policies will 
lead to a concentration of capital income among those with a lower marginal propensity 
to consume.
Such dynamics were clearly visible in the UK context. Over and above the modest 
extent of the initial redistribution of capital that Thatcher’s privatisation agenda achieved, 
analyses of share ownership patterns suggest that only around 40% of the original pur-
chasers of shares in newly privatised companies still held their stake by the end of the 
1980s (Marsh, 1991: 474). Viewed in terms of market capitalisation, the overall trend in 
share ownership in UK companies over the Thatcher years was away from small retail 
investors, towards larger institutional investors – in 1975, individuals owned 37.5% of 
UK quoted shares, but by 1990, they only held 20.3% (Figure 1).3 It was common to see 
a rapid decline in shareholdings in newly privatised companies, as small investors cashed-
out. The number of shareholders in British Steel fell from 650,553 when privatised in 
1988 to 335,224 by March 1991, while the number of shareholders in BAA fell from 
2,187,500 in July 1987 to 798,643 in June 1990 (Parker, 2013: 520). The effect of 
Thatcher’s reforms on home ownership was more durable, reflecting the tendency of 
people to remain owner-occupiers once they have stepped on to the ‘housing ladder’. 
Nevertheless, UK home ownership levels peaked in 2003 (Heywood, 2011), and, despite 
a modest uptick from 2016, they remain markedly lower than their historical high (Pacitti 
and Tomlinson, 2020). The secular trend towards lower property ownership levels looks 
set to continue, as younger cohorts increasingly struggle to raise deposits amid wage 
stagnation and rising property prices (Cribb et al., 2018).
To summarise, then, in theory, the growth model of property-owning democracy offers 
a solution to the demand deficiencies of trickle-down economics. Broadening capital own-
ership can bring the marginal propensity to consume capital income into alignment with 
wage income, rendering stable growth viable under neoliberal distributional policies. In 
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practice, however, this growth regime requires an ambitious initial redistribution of the 
total capital stock (not just publicly owned assets), and this redistribution must be periodi-
cally repeated – putting it in tension with conventional pro-capital distributive policies. 
Faced with the modest scale of Thatcher’s redistributive achievements, it is reasonable to 
query whether her government genuinely sought to implement a property-owning democ-
racy and was simply mistaken in its analysis or thwarted in its efforts, or whether her ver-
sion of property-owning democracy should be considered primarily as a rhetorical gloss 
applied to a more conventional profit-led growth model, as Marxist scholars or analysts of 
Conservative ‘statecraft’ might argue.
Nevertheless, understanding the hypothetical growth model advanced by the Thatcher 
government still illuminates the evolution of the United Kingdom’s actual growth model. 
Most obviously, it highlights another way in which ‘neoliberalism in practice’ might be 
justified, which may hold more popular appeal than the comparatively austere injunctions 
of trickle-down economics. In practical terms, too, the policies associated with the crea-
tion of a property-owning democracy contributed to the emergence of a debt-driven 
growth model. The sale of public assets created demand for consumer credit products to 
help households to purchase and manage these assets (Edwards, 2017). The burgeoning 
financial services industry facilitated the rapid expansion of household borrowing, from 
circa 30% of GDP in 1980 to circa 60% of GDP by the early 1990s (Figure 2). That 
growth unravelled so dramatically following the housing price crash of 1989 indicates the 
extent to which demand had relied upon debt (often related to short-term trends in asset 
prices, particularly housing), rather than stable long-run trends in wages coupled with 
broadly distributed capital income and gains (Backhouse, 2002; Hay, 2013; Wood and 
Stockhammer, 2020). At the same time, the reliance of demand upon debt should come as 
little surprise, given the relatively limited degree to which Thatcher’s government actu-
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Figure 1. Ownership of UK-listed shares (percentage total market value).
Source: ONS.
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Blair and the knowledge economy
Blair’s government has often been portrayed as continuing the Thatcherite growth model, 
relying upon rising house prices and increasing household debt as a driver of demand, a 
growth model that ultimately unravelled with the credit crunch of 2007–2008 (Carstensen 
and Matthijs, 2018; Hay, 2013; Jessop, 2015). Certainly, Blair left many of the pro-capital 
distributive policies of the Thatcher era in place, including deregulated labour markets, 
private sector involvement in the provision of public services, and low taxes on corpora-
tions and high-income individuals (Taylor, 2007). Demand in the United Kingdom 
remained stubbornly dependent upon average households, who typically owned minimal 
capital other than a share in their own homes – and whose confidence as consumers 
depended upon rising house prices as collateral.
Yet, these were not the terms in which key architects of New Labour presented and justi-
fied their policies; and they may not have been the terms in which they understood these 
policies either. Senior Labour figures argued that the bargaining power of labour could be 
strengthened in spite of pro-capital distributional policies, provided government invested 
adequately in skills and digital infrastructure. Translated into growth models terminology, 
New Labour was effectively claiming to have devised a new form of wage-led growth.
In order to understand the logic behind this hypothetical growth model, it is necessary 
to revisit the understanding of the ‘knowledge economy’ that rose to prominence in UK 
and US policy circles during the 1990s (e.g. Coyle, 1999; Reich, 1991). According to this 
account, advanced capitalist democracies were undergoing a shift away from economic 
growth based upon the physical production of physical goods and services, towards eco-
nomic growth based upon intellectual labour, often culminating in the production of 
intangible outputs such as new designs, processes and software code. Knowledge-
intensive sectors of the economy – such as computer programming, the creative indus-
tries, finance or pharmaceuticals – would become increasingly important as providers of 
jobs and drivers of productivity growth. Knowledge work would play an increasingly 
prominent role in other sectors, too, as routine functions such as processing sales or pro-
viding generic information were automated, liberating human workers to focus on design-
ing and maintaining these systems, or providing bespoke advice tailored to individual 
customers. The production of ‘knowledge’ depended upon the advanced skills and exper-
tise of knowledge workers, and thus countries that could offer businesses a bountiful 









Figure 2. United Kingdom household debt as a percentage of GDP.
Source: IMF.
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On this account, the rise of the knowledge economy promised to shift bargaining 
power away from capital and towards (skilled) labour, due to the declining relevance of 
traditional capital to the production process, relative to the ideas and expertise of staff. 
Influential figures within and around New Labour were quick to emphasise this point. As 
Geoff Mulgan – who would go on to lead the Number 10 Policy Unit under Blair from 
2003 to 2004 – claimed in his 1997 book, Connexity:
In the twenty-first-century economy the most valuable things are rarely physical, and it is 
possible to create wealth almost out of nothing, or rather nothing more than ideas . . . Virtual 
companies are being established without an office and in some cases without even a staff. Others 
have no easily definable property. Small software companies regularly emerge as if from 
nowhere to become corporate titans, just as traders now deal on world markets from remote 
cottages. (Mulgan, 1997: 214)
If capital is of declining economic importance relative to skilled labour, then it follows 
that successful businesses need to treat their knowledge workers well in order to reap the 
benefits of their expertise. As a Department of Trade and Industry white paper put it, 
‘modern and successful companies draw their success from the existence and develop-
ment of partnership at work’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998: 3). Charles 
Leadbeater, a sometime adviser to the 10 Downing Street Policy Unit during the Blair 
years, made a similar point in his 1999 book, Living on Thin Air:
A traditional company is founded on the assertion of the shareholders’ property rights. A know-
how company is founded on an agreement among producers to relinquish their rights to their 
work and to combine together . . . As economies become more knowledge-intensive, there will 
be more know-how-based companies, owned through social contracts between knowledge 
workers rather than by traditional shareholders. (Leadbeater, 1999: 177–178)
Framed in the language of growth models analysis, these commentators were claim-
ing that the rise of the knowledge economy implied a shift in the distribution of national 
income, away from capital and towards labour. Crucially, this shift did not require a 
major change from the labour market policies of the neoliberal era (Addison and Siebert, 
2002). Rather than empowering workers vis-à-vis capital through a formal change in 
their employment rights, policymakers instead had to provide workers with education, 
which would strengthen their bargaining position due to underlying changes in the com-
position and needs of the economy. As the Department of Social Security insisted in a 
1998 green paper, ‘employment security increasingly depends not on attachment to a 
single employer, but on having skills that will attract a range of employers’ (Department 
of Social Security, 1998: 43). Blair (2007) himself put the point even more bluntly, 
declaring in one of his final speeches as Prime Minister that ‘the challenge today is to 
make the employee powerful, not in conflict with the employer but in terms of their 
marketability in the modern workforce’. By ensuring individual workers had marketable 
skills, advanced capitalist economies could enjoy all the efficiency gains of flexible 
labour markets, while simultaneously strengthening the bargaining power of employees 
relative to their employers.
Interestingly, the claim that the rise of the knowledge economy involved a shift in 
bargaining power from capital to labour is consistent with UK data. As Figure 3 indicates, 
in the United Kingdom, the wage share of national income increased from the mid 1990s 
to the early 2000s, leaving it higher by the time Blair stood down than at any point since 
12 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
Thatcher took office. In and of itself, however, this shift was insufficient to change the 
United Kingdom’s growth model to broad-based wage-led demand, because it also coin-
cided with rises in income inequality. While the decline of median income levels relative 
to mean income levels that took place over the 1980s halted in the early 1990s, the trend 
resumed from 1997 onwards (Figure 4), and the share of national income accruing to the 
top 10% of earners continued to increase over this period, albeit at a slightly slower rate 
than in the 1980s (Figure 5). In growth models terms, this pattern might be seen as an 
alternative form of ‘neoliberalism in practice’. Even though the distribution of national 
income shifts away from capital back towards labour, because the distribution of wage 
income between households is skewed in favour of the more affluent (who have a lower 
marginal propensity to consume), the expected demand benefits fail to emerge. This 
raises an important methodological point: analyses of growth models need to pay greater 
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Figure 4. Divergence in mean and median income levels.
Source: ONS.
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labour share straightforwardly translate into broad-based wage-led demand (Carvalho 
and Rezai, 2016).
In theory, New Labour’s knowledge-based growth model might have addressed these 
distributive problems. If increasingly unequal salaries were a consequence of demand for 
highly skilled workers, then increasing the supply of these workers (through social invest-
ment in education) should curb the premium they command. Highly educated young 
workers were indeed among those enjoying significant wage increases during this period; 
Walker and Zhu (2008) document an increase in the wage premium enjoyed by the top 
quartile of young UK graduates between 1994 and 2006 (of 12% for men and 10% for 
women), despite the expansion in higher education that took place from the late 1980s 
onward. Blair (2000) seemed to subscribe to this analysis of the origins of wage inequal-
ity, arguing that knowledge-driven growth would – without further intervention – ‘be the 
sole domain of elite knowledge workers’; his social investment agenda was intended to 
combat these trends and ‘democratise the new economy’.
As with Thatcher’s property-owning democracy, there is a question as to whether New 
Labour’s actions matched its analysis. True, public spending on education did increase – 
from 4.1% of GDP in 1997 to 4.9% of GDP in 2007 – helping to achieve improved 
teacher-to-pupil ratios, and improved student performance in national standardised tests 
(Smithers, 2007). Whether these efforts were sufficient to shift the United Kingdom’s 
growth model is another matter. During Blair’s time in office, the gap between mean and 
median income continued to grow (see Figure 4), suggesting that New Labour’s educa-
tional investments did not succeed in reducing wage inequality. Absent broad-based 
wage-led growth, the conventional account of the Blair years as a period in which demand 
was fuelled by household borrowing, which ultimately proved unsustainable, is still valid. 
During this period, borrowing functioned in part as a substitute for rising wages as a 
source of improved living standards for lower income households, and as a source of 
demand for the economy as a whole (Bunn and Rostom, 2014; Stockhammer, 2015).
Does this discredit knowledge-driven growth as a growth model? Not necessarily. 
Arguably, 10 years is too short a time-period over which to assess the adequacy of 
Labour’s educational investments. Alternatively, perhaps the theory was not at fault, but 
the implementation: many contemporary critics queried whether the scale of social invest-
ment carried out by Blair was sufficient to match his professed ambitions (see, for exam-
ple, Hutton, 2001). Might New Labour’s intended growth model have been feasible, 
granted a longer time horizon (and perhaps also a shift in the quantity and quality of 





























































Figure 5. Post-tax income share of top 10%.
Source: World inequality database.
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country that also bucked the downwards trend in the wage share of GDP in the late 1990s, 
but which displayed a smaller increase in wage inequality than the United Kingdom – 
arguing that its ‘balanced growth model was made possible by the (growing) importance 
of knowledge-intensive, high value-added, goods and services in the Swedish export mix’ 
(Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 176–177).
It remains an open question as to whether continued investment over a longer time 
horizon, or a more ambitious social investment agenda, would have transformed New 
Labour’s hypothetical growth model from theory into reality. The idea that educational 
investment will pave the way for broad-based wage-led growth assumes that inequalities 
in income in the knowledge economy era are primarily attributable to inequalities in edu-
cation. Although there is an extensive (largely US-focused) literature arguing that techno-
logical progress pushes up demand for higher skilled workers, increasing wage inequality 
(Autor et al., 1998; Goldin and Katz, 2009), this is not the only possible explanation of 
these income disparities. Wage inequality might also reflect the disempowerment of 
lower paid workers through de-unionisation (Kristal and Cohen, 2017), the rent-seeking 
behaviours of the highly paid (Hargreaves, 2018; Piketty et al., 2014) or superstar effects 
arising from winner-take-most market dynamics (Gabaix et al., 2016). Improving the sup-
ply of highly skilled workers does not address these sources of wage inequality.
Even if wage inequality can be traced back to increased demand for highly skilled 
workers, and even if supply-increasing educational investment were to reduce the wage 
premium they command, this would not guarantee a shift to broad-based wage-led 
growth. Such growth requires two elements: not just wage increases broadly distributed 
among wage earners, but also an increase in the wage share of national income. It is not 
inconceivable that increasing the supply of skilled labour might weaken the bargaining 
power of labour relative to capital. The outcome depends upon multiple factors, including 
how technological change augments and/or substitutes for different skillsets, elasticity of 
demand for different kinds of labour and the prevalence of rents (European Commission, 
2007: 237–272). Figure 3 reminds us that, contrary to the dominant 1990s account of 
knowledge-driven growth, the rise of the knowledge economy was not accompanied eve-
rywhere by increases in the labour share. This should not come as a surprise, given many 
knowledge-intensive companies derive competitive advantages from capital as opposed 
to labour, monopolising intangible assets such as intellectual property and user networks, 
which are not superseded as rapidly as earlier advocates of knowledge-driven growth 
anticipated. Viewed in comparative context, the recovery of the labour share in the United 
Kingdom appears anomalous – and, while a more detailed exploration of this divergence 
lies beyond the scope of this article, the rise of the knowledge economy and a policy 
agenda predicated upon knowledge-driven growth cannot readily explain this recovery, 
as these factors were also present in countries that experienced different trends. Despite 
some excellent recent scholarship on transitions to the knowledge economy (e.g. Durazzi, 
2019; Hope and Martelli, 2019), more research is needed into the variables driving such 
differing results.
In sum, New Labour’s model of knowledge-driven growth remains at the level of 
hypothesis, not conclusively disproven, but subject (at the very least) to multiple contin-
gencies and caveats. Nevertheless, as with property-owning democracy, this hypothetical 
growth model had real-world consequences. It served to legitimise the United Kingdom’s 
actual growth model, justifying the continuation of pro-capital distributive policies by a 
centre-left government (and quite possibly justifying those policies to that government 
too). Furthermore, it facilitated the expansion of household debt in more subtle ways. So 
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long as households, banks and government alike were persuaded of the productivity mira-
cle of knowledge-driven growth, expanding household debt could be viewed as relatively 
unproblematic, secured as it was against the expectation of future wage gains – giving 
both regulators and lenders a reason to countenance further borrowing.
Conclusion
Both Thatcher’s property-owning democracy and Blair’s knowledge economy implied 
different growth models to the pro-capital distributional policies under wage-led demand 
conditions that they ultimately produced (see Table 2). These hypothetical growth models 
posited that the distribution of capital and wage income (respectively) would broaden 
substantially: had this been achieved, it would have resolved the demand deficiencies 
associated with ‘neoliberalism in practice’. Thatcher’s property-owning democracy 
implied that capital income would be widely distributed, placing it at the disposal of 
households with a higher marginal propensity to consume. Blair’s knowledge economy 
implied a shift in national income from capital to skilled labour, meaning working house-
holds with a higher marginal propensity to consume would receive a larger share of 
national income, provided the education system endowed them with the skills necessary 
to seize these opportunities.
In neither case was the hypothesised growth model achieved. Redistribution from the 
public sector to the private sector under Thatcher broadened the range of households in 
receipt of capital income (share ownership levels increased from 7% to 20.5% of the adult 
population between 1979 and 1988), yet this was still far from aligning capital income 
with wage earners’ marginal propensity to consume. Moreover, when measured by value, 
individuals’ share in total UK-listed equity declined over the Thatcher years. The emer-
gence of the knowledge economy, at least in its UK form, did coincide with a shift in 
national income towards labour, but this also coincided with a shift in the distribution of 
income within labour, towards higher earners with a lower marginal propensity to con-
sume. Educational investment might have mitigated this problem in the long-run, but this 
was not guaranteed, as Blair’s investment agenda might have proved too modest; skills 
biased technological change may not have been the root cause of these wage inequalities; 
and even if it had been, a surfeit of skilled workers might have weakened labour’s bar-
gaining hand vis-à-vis capital. In other words, neither policy agenda produced a shift 
towards a more stable growth model, whether profit-led (in Thatcher’s case) or wage-led 
(in Blair’s case), and this dysfunction can be attributed to an insufficiently broad distribu-
tion of profits on one hand, and wages on the other hand.
Table 2. Knowledge-driven growth and property-owning democracy as growth models.
Distributional policies
 Pro-capital Pro-labour
Demand regime Profit-led Property-owning democracy in 
theory
 
Wage-led Property-owning democracy in 
practice
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The foregoing analysis has ramifications both for the academic study of growth mod-
els, and for the practice of public policy in developed democracies. For scholars of politi-
cal economy, it highlights how analysing growth models in terms of pro-capital or 
pro-labour shifts in national income alone can provide a misleading picture. If we fail to 
recognise the potential for capital to be widely distributed, we fail to appreciate how 
property-owning democracy might offer a route towards stable broad-based profit-led 
demand. If we fail to recognise the potential for labour income to be narrowly distributed, 
we fail to appreciate how wage-led demand might fall short even as the distribution of 
national income shifts in favour of labour. If we are interested in understanding the pat-
terns and pathologies of aggregate demand, we must consider not just the distribution of 
national income between labour and capital, but also the distribution of income within 
labour and capital.
In practical policy terms, these historical episodes point to the possibility of alterna-
tives to the export-led and consumption-led growth models that have dominated recent 
scholarship (for a complementary critique of this literature, albeit from a different meth-
odological/historical perspective, see Kohler and Stockhammer, 2021). Stable profit-led 
growth under pro-capital distributive policies is, on Lavoie and Stockhammer’s frame-
work, precluded due to low marginal propensity to consume among wealthier households 
and/or slow income growth among wage earners, forcing a reliance on either net exports 
or credit-driven household consumption as a source of demand. Yet, a more egalitarian 
distribution of wealth, as implied by property-owning democracy, would mean that the 
returns on capital would be more widely distributed, thereby accruing to households with 
a higher marginal propensity to consume. Obviously, the fact that these returns are con-
sumed rather than reinvested means that over time, poorer households will see their share 
of wealth decline relative to wealthier households that save or reinvest those returns. The 
challenge facing advocates of a property-owning democracy is thus how to create and 
maintain a democratic distribution of property.
Knowledge-driven growth, too, offers an alternative growth model to the approaches 
that Lavoie and Stockhammer characterise as ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. In theory 
at least, the increasing importance of skilled labour to knowledge-intensive production 
processes could empower skilled workers to negotiate a higher share of the proceeds of 
growth – even under distributional policies that might conventionally be viewed as pro-
capital. In practice, the rise of the knowledge economy has seen the labour share of 
national income continue to fall in many developed democracies, and many knowledge-
intensive business models have proven to be highly capital-intensive. Nevertheless, some 
varieties of knowledge capitalism may be less capital-intensive than others, or may see 
increases in capital intensity augment the productivity of (skilled) labour to the overall 
benefit of the labour share (European Commission, 2007). In the United Kingdom, the 
labour share did increase in the late 1990s, raising the prospect of broad-based wage-led 
growth. However, this development also coincided with a rise in wage inequality, skew-
ing the proceeds of growth towards households with a lower marginal propensity to con-
sume. Increasing the supply of suitably-skilled workers might mitigate this wage 
inequality; but it is also possible that educational expansion may simultaneously weaken 
the bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis capital, reducing the labour share and undermin-
ing prospects for balanced wage-led growth.
While this article has focused on the UK case, these policy lessons are of wider appli-
cability. Over the last 40 years, market-driven and knowledge-driven approaches to 
growth have dominated the economic policy agenda in diverse developed democracies 
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(Hall, 2015). To the extent that economic policy today remains beholden to some combi-
nation of these strategies, actually existing growth models are likely to remain dependent 
upon credit-fuelled consumption and/or net exports as a substitute for broader-based 
wage-led demand – unless the distributive issues that give rise to dysfunctional shortfalls 
in demand are addressed.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Craig Berry and Sean McDaniel, as well as two anonymous reviewers from 
BJPIR, for invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier iterations of this paper.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Nick O’Donovan  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0588-7734
Notes
1. The two approaches are not diametrically opposed; see Hope and Soskice (2016).
2. Other strategic considerations also influence politicians’ decisions, such as administrative and political 
viability (Hall, 1989), preventing politicians from implementing the policies implied by their cognitive 
beliefs. However, Lavoie and Stockhammer suggest that the pro-capital distributional policies consistent 
with ‘neoliberalism in theory’ were implemented.
3. The decline in individual ownership is largely offset by a rise in pension fund ownership, providing a fur-
ther channel for the (re)distribution of capital income. Although beyond the scope of this article, explor-
ing the distributive implications of pension changes would be a valuable addition to the growth models 
analysis.
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